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Homeland security has spiraled into Stage Five of the Issue Attention Cycle.1 
Stage Five – the post-problem stage – means homeland security again operates 
principally behind the public apron. Stakeholders sedulously sift through the 
grist of homeland security’s congressional, industrial, academic, and bureaucratic 
complex. The professionals who populate that complex spend their days 
calibrating the strategies, programs, and institutions disjunctively formed in the 
earlier stages of the Cycle.  
Except for an occasional fifteen minutes of public attention to dead terrorists, 
disrupted plots, and grant cuts, homeland security is not an issue high on the 
public’s agenda.2 It could leap back on top in an instant.3 But for now most 
conversations about homeland security take place within a comparatively small 
community. 
The issues are largely the same ones talked about for the last five years: 
funding, threats, hazards, borders, interoperability, intelligence, response, 
transportation, equipment, and – recently – pandemics.4 Unarguable progress 
has been made in all these domains. We clearly are better prepared – for some 
things – than we were in the autumn of 2001. Equally as certain, there are miles 
to go before most of the nation’s jurisdictions get a “Sufficient” rating in future 
national preparedness assessments.5 
Stage Five in the Issue Attention Cycle means there is little political will to 
substantially alter the hodgepodge federalism that characterizes U.S. homeland 
security. The system we have is the one we have to work with, at least until 
something significant happens: another attack, a catastrophic natural disaster, a 
national public health emergency, or a new political administration. 6  
Until the system is shocked, much homeland security work will be 
incremental. It will continue to focus on the mundane but institutionally 
important work of answering “how prepared are we, how prepared do we need to 
be, and how do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”7 The operational agenda 
will funnel attention toward measuring outputs and outcomes, and stutter fitfully 
around peripatetic priorities, like “creating a culture of preparedness” or 
modernizing “our planning processes, products, tools, and the training, 
education, and development of homeland security planners who are expected to 
use them.”8   
If the country is never attacked again, if there are no more national traumas, 
then incrementalism is a cautious, stable and appropriate way to continue to 
improve homeland security. But if something calamitous does happen, 
incrementalism does not stand a chance. 
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Ammunition and Weapons 
Management attends to the realism of what is. Leadership looks toward what 
could be, what should be. What should the future be like in homeland security? 
And how can we get there? 
Future-thinking homeland security leaders are like ammunition, particularly 
during Stage Five. They are seeking weapons – looking for opportunities to be 
used. Elected and other political officials are the weapons, especially primed to do 
battle during times of national crisis, when the Attention Cycle coils around to 
“alarmed discovery.”   
Immediately after the next national trauma, elected officials will be looking for 
answers, for ideas about what to do to respond to the “discovery” that we remain 
exposed to a cluster of vulnerabilities already familiar to homeland security 
specialists. Elementary schools – critical infrastructure to the parents of every 
student – are unprotected targets. Chemical plants – patiently waiting to be 
weaponized – sit in the midst of high-density populations. The medical care 
system has about ten percent of the ventilators needed during a pandemic. Foot 
and Mouth disease, caused by a virus that can easily be brought into the country, 
can infect livestock in an entire region and significantly affect food related 
businesses, employment, and economies. The list of how vulnerable the nation is 
to harm is practically endless.9 
The next significant national event will create an environment that supports, if 
not demands, substantial change. What should those changes be? More of the 
same, but with added discipline and control? A rededication to the principles of 
authentic federalism? A re-imagining of our core civil liberties? Something 
completely different? 
What will homeland security leaders recommend after the next tragedy? Less 
dramatically, what ideas will they champion when city, state, or national political 
administrations change?   
The questions should be discussed now, before answers are needed, before 
emotion drowns deliberation.   
Responses to these open-ended questions will emerge from conversations 
among people who care about homeland security when it is not on top of the 
nation’s policy agenda. The discussions will be based on a mix of research, 
experience, opinion, ideology, and bias. Participants in the conversation will be 
political officials, interest group representatives, public administrators, 
academics, professional commentators, the occasional unattached citizen, and 
others who form the amoebic body of homeland security leaders. These are 
people who could be called Stage Five leaders. 
 
You Might Be A Homeland Security Leader If . . .  
Anyone who has read this far can probably name at least half a dozen people they 
look to for thoughtful homeland security ideas and perspectives. You can find 
familiar names on books and articles, in the appendices of Department of 
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Homeland Security (DHS) and think tank reports, and at congressional 
hearings.10 Stage Five leaders routinely appear at homeland security conferences, 
on workshop panels, and in subject matter expert groups. Recently some of them 
have been featured in media tales about former government officials who moved 
to private industry.11   
The leaders come from many arenas. Their ideas can help shape the future of 
homeland security. What should they be talking about? 
 “What is past is prologue” is inscribed on a statue outside of the National 
Archives, home of the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and other 
foundational America charters.12 The phrase implies those who are interested in 
the future have an obligation to know 
something about the past. 
Homeland security is old enough to 
have a past. Part of that past is 
encapsulated in the strategies, policies, 
programs, and processes that shape the 
work of the homeland security 
professional. How much of this past do 
you know?  
 Try your hand at answering the 
following questions. Suggestively, they 
outline what could be called basic 
homeland security literacy – at least in 
the cognitive domain.  
1. What is the official definition of 
Homeland Security? Absent an official 
definition, what is a defensible 
definition? How does that compare with 
the official definition? 
2.  Identify the basic elements of the nation’s homeland security policy. 
3. Describe the objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. If you have a state or local perspective, also identify the 
objectives of your jurisdiction’s homeland security strategy. Extra 
points if you can highlight the prevention elements in any of the 
strategies. 
4. How many of the eight principles that shaped the National Strategy 
can you name? 
5. How many homeland security presidential directives have been 
issued? Extra leadership points given for each one you can describe 
(and saying “HSPD 1, HSPD 2, …” doesn’t count). 
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6. What is the National Preparedness Goal? What is the “vision” for the 
national preparedness goal? What is the difference between the two? 
How much of either can you recite?   
7. Identify the seven priorities for national preparedness. Add extra 
points for being able to separate them into “overarching priorities” and 
“priorities to build specific capabilities.” Double your point score for 
this question if you can repeat the rumor about an eighth priority, 
supposedly added after Katrina. 
8. What are the National Planning Scenarios? How are they intended to 
help preparedness? On what basis have they been criticized?  Without 
looking, how many can you describe? 
9. What is the difference between the TCL and the UTL? How many 
items are in each group (plus or minus ten percent)? Where do they fit 
within the “culture of preparedness?” 
10. Explain the difference between, and relationships among, NIMS, 
ICS, NRP, ESF, unity of command, and unified command. Subtract 
points from your final score if you have to look up the acronyms. 
11. Define “risk.” How is risk determined? How do you distinguish risk 
from threat and vulnerability? How many definitions of risk can you 
cite? You get one extra point for each definition, up to a maximum of 
22. 
12. Provide convincing distinctions among the terms prevention, 
protection, readiness, and preparedness. Three extra points for 
identifying the national policy document that defines prevention as 
activities undertaken “during the early stages of an incident.” 
13. Draw your jurisdiction’s homeland security organizational or 
network structure. Which agency or people are the critical nodes in 
that system, and why? Extra points if the structure extends beyond 
your jurisdiction’s political boundaries. 
14. Explain the process used to decide the 2006 DHS grant awards. 
Identify how much it costs your jurisdiction – direct and indirect costs 
– for each dollar of homeland security funding it receives. 
15. Describe how you have, or plan to, or should, measure the impact of 
homeland security programs and spending in your jurisdiction. 
16. Have you seen and understood your jurisdiction’s most recent 
threat assessment? If no, why not? If yes, what did you do with the 
information? Who do you tell what your requirements are for 
intelligence? 
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17.  Have you initiated or responded to a DHS data call? Have you seen 
or used the results of that call? How? 
18. Can you identify the most significant critical infrastructure in your 
jurisdiction? To whom is it significant? What proportion of your critical 
infrastructure is outside your ability to control or influence? 
19. Describe your jurisdiction’s crisis communication strategy. 
Additional points awarded for identifying the core message that will be 
communicated for specific catastrophic incidents. 
20. How important is homeland security to the public officials and 
citizens in your jurisdiction? How do you know? Additional points if 
homeland security is important enough to you to have at least one 
emergency preparedness kit and a family crisis plan. 
 
 Extra Credit – Multiple choice (select all that apply).  
You don’t know the answer to some or all of the above questions, but you:  
 a) Know where to find the answers;  
 b) Know someone who can tell you the answers if and when you ever 
need them;  
 c) Know better questions to ask; or  
 d) Know more effective ways to figure out who the Stage Five homeland 
security leaders are. 
 
What Should Stage Five Leaders Be Talking About? 
How did you do? In my experience, very few homeland security leaders are able 
to correctly answer more than half of those somewhat pedantic questions. (In the 
past year, I have found only one person who can say what the vision is for the 
National Preparedness Goal.)   
The questions have superficial face validity about one’s level of homeland 
security literacy. However, one could argue (perhaps convincingly) that knowing 
details is not what leadership ought to be about. Leadership should be about big-
picture issues; the forest rather than the trees; the 30,000-foot view of homeland 
security – pick your own metaphor. Details – although important – are for the 
people who manage what leaders create.13 
 
Three Big Homeland Security Pictures 
There are at least three big-picture perspectives that can frame conversations 
about the future of homeland security: strict constructionism, middle-of-the-road 
moderation, and radical reconstructionism.14 
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The traditional view – if one can use the word “traditional” with anything 
related to homeland security – is that homeland security initially was about 
preventing and responding to terrorism.15 The post-Katrina and the pre-
pandemic political environment has expanded the scope of what constitutes 
homeland security. Should that expansion be resisted, embraced, ignored?   
Strict constructionists embrace the traditional perspective. They maintain 
homeland security is about terrorism, pure and simple, just as it says in the 
National Strategy. Other agencies deal with other policy issues. Homeland 
Security can collaborate with them. Let FEMA, state, and local emergency 
management agencies have natural disasters. Public health can take the lead for 
pandemics. The terrorism portfolio belongs unambiguously to homeland 
security.  
Middle-of-the-road moderates are in a second group. They agree homeland 
security is about terrorism. But they say it should and could be about more than 
that. Concentrating too much on terrorism reduces overall readiness. They offer 
the Katrina response as evidence. 
“9/11 was a distraction for us,” said one western state emergency management 
official. “Our threats are wildfires and tornados. Since homeland security showed 
up, we’ve gotten away from planning, training and doing exercises about our 
actual threats. Now people are too busy writing homeland security grants and 
reports to work on our real issues. If anything, we’ve fallen behind.”16  
“When are we going to be finished with this preparedness business so we can 
get back to our regular work?” asked an eastern state administrator.17  
Middle-of-the-road moderates draw attention to the dual-use value of 
emergency preparedness structures and processes. 
One state emergency management leader said, in response to criticisms that 
terrorism displaces effort, “What we do to get prepared for an all hazards 
response can help us respond to other threats, like terrorism and pandemics.” 18   
Radical reconstructionists advocate a third perspective. They assert that 
homeland security is about much more than stopping the next terrorist attack, 
responding to natural disasters, or getting ready for pandemics. The public safety 
disciplines struggling to find unifying themes can help the nation by paying more 
attention to the social and economic conditions that give rise to and support 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience.”19  
A lexicographer cautions not to “confuse sécurité, the feeling of having nothing 
to fear, and sûreté, the state of having nothing to fear.”20 Radical 
reconstructionists focus on the state of having nothing (or at least less) to fear. 
They contrast the comparatively few Americans who have been killed by 
terrorists with the substantial number of people killed each year by traffic 
accidents, tobacco, seasonal flu, and other preventable events. They ask why 
homeland security is not more concerned with gang violence, illegal drugs, 
inadequate public health and medical care, second-rate educational systems, and 
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other domestic policy problems that ultimately have as much to do with 
homeland sûrete as countering terrorism.21  
Many of our national homeland security and defense-related strategies have 
short-term and long-term elements.22 Short-term strategic work is directed at 
immediate problems. Long-term activities aim to address underlying causes of 
those problems.23 Self-starter Islamic fundamentalist terrorists are a growing 
domestic threat.24 Left and right wing domestic terrorists are still active.25 
Homeland security needs both short- and long-term perspectives. From a social 
perspective, its current operational point of view is too short, too narrow. 
Radical reconstructionists argue the behemoth that is the Department of 
Homeland Security – and eventually its state and local functional counterparts – 
could usefully collaborate with other agencies to dampen the social conditions 
that contribute to domestic unrest, including terrorism. How many years without 
attacks have to pass before politicians stop providing forty billion dollar budgets? 
How many uninsured or underemployed or uneducated does it take to create a 
homeland security problem? As those who focus on social capital and the 
community development dimensions of homeland security suggest, “It’s tough to 
be a terrorist in a caring community.”26  
 
AN INVITATION 
The conversational terrain shaping the future of homeland security sits 
somewhere between being able to recite the National Preparedness Goal and 
advocating that DHS evolve into a social services agency.   
Regardless of how you did on the basic literacy test, or what big picture you 
may subscribe to, you are invited to participate in a thought experiment to 
answer the question: What should homeland security leaders be talking about?   
Envision a strategic conversation among Stage Five leaders.  The conversation 
is strategic in the sense that it concentrates on the large purposes and activities of 
homeland security as a policy area within the wider social, economic, and 
political environment.27 It is oriented more toward the possibilities of the future 
than the pressing concerns of today. It is a conversation in the sense of civil 
communication among participants. It is characterized by cognitive and affective 
maturity, listening, risking, and learning. That is the premise for the experiment. 
Now, what are the participants in this conversation talking about? 
If you are interested in sharing your thoughts, please send an email to 
cbellavi@nps.edu describing what you think Stage Five homeland security 
leaders ought to be talking about and why.   
We will publish creative, provocative, and thoughtful responses in the next 
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